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The increasing pace of change in the federal acquisition environment coupled 
with a new emphasis on contracting accessions have increased the interest in the 
models utilized by the DoD to (1) measure the contracting workload, and (2) assign 
adequate resources to effectively manage the workload with an acceptable level of 
risk.   
Numerous acquisition studies and commissions have cited personnel 
management as one of the most critical factors contributing to the success or failure 
of buying organizations. Strategic human capital management and DoD contract 
management have been on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) High-risk 
List for the last several years. Actions made toward understanding the optimal size 
and capabilities of the acquisition workforce are a first step toward the development 
and execution of an integrated strategic human capital management plan. Moreover, 
joint basing and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) requirements to merge and 
consolidate some contracting offices increase the importance of moving toward a 
workforce model that is applicable in the joint environment.  
The primary goal of this report is to identify differing methods used to assess 
workload and staffing in Army contracting organizations, as well as in the 
Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Civilian, and other commercial contracting 
organizations. This report identifies the key elements of various DoD Services’ 
contracting workforce staffing models. Furthermore, it investigates the rationale and 
assumptions utilized to develop these models. The validity and applicability of the 
rationale and assumptions to the current acquisition environment are discussed. 
This research investigates each of the Services’ workload and resource assessment 
methodologies in the operational (and in some cases weapon system) contracting 
environments. Comparisons and contrasts of the various methodologies are 
discussed. In addition, industry practices in measuring workload and procurement 
organization production are reviewed. Opportunities to incorporate or adapt industry 
standards are discussed. 
 iv 
 
Secondary research goals include identifying potential opportunities whereby 
the existing methodologies can be used to more accurately capture the amount and 
nature of the work performed by contracting organizations; to ensure that the 
complexity of the work being performed at various stages within the contract process 
are reflected in the workload models; and to ensure that the level and quality of work 
is reflected in performance measurement models.  
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This study focuses on identifying methods used to assess the workload of 
Government contracting personnel. In its most basic form, this research seeks to 
move the field toward answering the question, ―What size should my contracting 
organization be?‖ I acknowledge at the outset that the answer to this quantitative 
question is not in itself sufficient for organizational success. It is not simply the 
number of workers, but also the competencies of those workers that is essential in 
meeting mission requirements. However, competency assessment is not the subject 
of this research. Rather, the primary goal of this research is to identify differing 
methods used to assess workload and staffing in Army contracting organizations, as 
well as in the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Civilian, and other commercial 
contracting organizations.  
Mr. Jeffrey Parsons, the executive director of the recently formed Army 
Contracting Command (ACC) headquartered at Ft Belvoir in Northern Virginia, 
asked the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) to undertake this study to explore 
options for consistent measurement of contracting organization workload, and the 
commensurate application of contracting workforce resources to identified 
workloads. Numerous acquisition studies and commissions have cited workforce 
management as one of the most critical factors contributing to the success or failure 
of buying organizations. Furthermore, strategic human capital management and 
DoD Contract Management have been on the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) High-Risk List for the last several years. Moreover, joint basing and Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) requirements to merge and consolidate some 
contracting offices increases the importance of moving toward a workforce model 
that is applicable in the joint environment. Implementing a process to determine the 
required levels of contracting organization staffing are important in the development 
and execution of an integrated, strategic, human capital management plan. 
This report identifies the key elements of various DoD Services’ contracting 
workforce staffing models. Furthermore, it investigates the rationale and 
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assumptions utilized to develop these models. The strengths and weaknesses of the 
models are discussed. This research investigates each of the Services’ workload 
and resource assessment methodologies and includes various models used in the 
operational, (and in some cases weapon system) contracting environments. Models 
of contracting workload in contingency environments were not the focus of this 
study, however many of the findings are applicable to all contracting organizations. 
Comparisons and contrasts of the various methodologies are discussed. In addition, 
industry practices in measuring workload and procurement organization production 
are reviewed. Opportunities to incorporate or adapt industry standards are 
discussed. 
Secondary research goals are to identify potential opportunities whereby the 
existing methodologies can be used to more accurately capture the amount and 
nature of the work performed by contracting organizations; to ensure that the 
complexity of the work being performed at various stages within the contract process 
are reflected in the workload models; and to ensure that the level and quality of work 
is reflected in performance measurement models.  
The Army Contracting Command was officially established on October 1, 
2008, with Mr. Jeffrey Parsons as the executive director. This new Command 
essentially combined all of the contracting elements of the Army Materiel Command 
(AMC) (which includes such major subordinate commands as the Tank-Automotive 
& Armaments Command, the Communications Electronics Command, and the 
Aviation & Missile Command) with the contracting group in the former Army 
Contracting Agency. This new Command started with approximately 4,100 civilians, 
(of whom approximately 3,500 were contracting personnel in the GS-1102 
occupational career field), and 310 military officers and enlisted soldiers located 
around the globe. In 2010, there were approximately 5,300 military and civilian 
personnel in the ACC operating at 117 locations world-wide. The ACC expects to 
grow by approximately 25% over the next several years. 
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The research methodology used in this report consisted of two principal 
aspects. First, a review of the literature on workforce planning, workload 
assessment, and manpower modeling was conducted. The literature review included 
defense acquisition workload measurement reports, workforce studies, Federal 
Government workforce studies and reports, and human capital research and reports.  
Prominent organizations that have contributed to the open literature relevant to this 
study have been the RAND Corporation (which is a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center [FFRDC] for the DoD), the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), and various university and 
government research groups.  
Second, a review of the models currently in use and used in the past by DoD 
organizations, civilian contracting agencies, and industry best practices was 
conducted. These reviews led to an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing models, and to options for implementation. While the findings are directly 
relevant to the ACC, the findings also apply to other organizations that conduct 
contracting activities in the operational, systems acquisition, and contingency 
environments.  
A comparison of the results obtained from the various models through sample 
scenarios was originally intended for this research. The intention was to input actual 
organization data into various models and compare the results received from the 
various models. A review of the various data requirements of the models in the study 
revealed that the dissimilar types of data required by the various models rendered 
the comparison of models with actual data impractical.  
Following the Introduction section, this report is organized into the following 
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II. Literature Review 
A review of the literature revealed that it is conventional wisdom that growth in 
the DoD acquisition workforce is a necessity (e.g. .Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007; 
Gansler 2007; DoD, 2010). While subjective rationale is provided in the workforce 
planning literature, no quantitative basis for the specific growth figures was 
identified. The Defense Business Board (2010) provides the broad logic for the 
growth. 
Between 2010 and 2015, DoD will grow its DAW [Defense Acquisition 
Workforce] by 20K (from 127K to 147K), more than 15 percent. Ten thousand 
(10K) of the total will be from contractor conversions (insourcing) and 10K will 
be new hires (new billets). This increase will restore the DAW to late 1990s 
levels and is intended to restore core capabilities. (Defense Business Board, 
2010 p. 5) 
This leads to the following questions: If there is no answer to why 20,000 
more positions is the correct number, then how do we know to which Service or 
buying office the new positions should be assigned? How do we know which offices 
are currently adequately staffed and which offices are critically under staffed? What 
will be the most effective method to allocate these new positions to the offices with 
the greatest need? 
In order to answer these questions, the DoD requires a workload assessment 
model and a resource allocation model based on the projected workload of a buying 
office. While it may not be practical to implement a DoD-wide solution, a robust 
model for each Service; major command; or agency should be attainable. I sought to 
provide the basis for an examination of potential solutions through a review of the 
applicable literature. 
The primary sources of literature regarding the contracting workforce are: (1) 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), focusing principally on strategic human 
capital management and acquisition workforce issues; (2) the RAND Corporation, 
focusing principally on workforce planning; (3) the Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI), 
which, among other things, surveys the federal contracting workforce; (4) the Office 
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of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP); (5) Department of Defense (DOD) reports, 
directives, and instructions regarding acquisition career management; and (6) non-
governmental publications from both practitioners and scholars.  
This report is a continuation of the research stream relating to the Army 
acquisition workforce begun in 2008 and published in Demographics of the 
Contracting Workforce within the Army Contracting Command (Lamm & Reed, 
2009).  
Government Accountability Office 
Over the past several years, the GAO has addressed a variety of aspects of 
the Defense acquisition workforce. These aspects include strategic human capital 
planning, agency hiring and training practices, integration between civilian and 
military workforces, workforce trends, private-sector principles, workforce size and 
structure, and DoD workforce reform and improvement efforts. GAO investigations 
continue to serve as a reminder of both the distance traveled on workforce strategy 
development, and the miles yet to go. 
Most recently, in September 2010, the GAO released a report entitled Human 
Capital: Further Actions Needed to Enhance DOD’s Civilian Strategic Workforce 
Plan. The audit report found that key requirements such as identifying funding for 
training civilian employees, analyzing workforce skill gaps, and assessing progress 
and results have not been fully addressed. The report also indicated that the current 
DoD plan does not specify the appropriate acquisition workforce makeup and has 
not developed guidance to help program offices meet workforce planning objectives. 
(GAO, 2010). 
The report cites the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as seeking ―an 
appropriately sized cadre of acquisition personnel who have the skills and training 
necessary to successfully perform their jobs‖ (GAO, 2010, p. 2). However, there is 
neither guidance as to what size an appropriately sized cadre should be, nor how to 
determine the appropriate size. 
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The GAO did identify several workforce models and software applications 
used to forecast future changes in the workforce, but not workload requirements. 
These applications include the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) workforce 
forecasting software, Workforce Analysis Support System (WASS) and Civilian 
Forecasting System (CIVFORS). WASS is used to evaluate workforce trends using 
such characteristics as employee age and retirement plan participation. The OPM 
also conducts the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey, which measures employees’ 
perceptions of how successful their agencies are in key performance areas. The 
survey results can be sorted by agency and topic and are available for public access 
at the OPM’s website (http://www.fedview.opm.gov/).  
CIVFORS was adapted from an Army military forecasting model for civilian 
use in 1987 and uses data from the DoD’s Defense Civilian Personnel Data System 
(DCPDS) (GAO, 2010). CIVFORS is a life cycle modeling and projection tool, which 
models most significant events, including personnel actions such as promotions, 
reassignments, and retirements. Officials can use a default model scenario or 
develop their own. The forecasts cover a seven-year projection period. CIVFORS is 
used at the DoD level, but it is not mandated at the Service level. As a result, each 
Service may use various systems and approaches for their workforce projection 
forecasts (GAO, 2010). 
Acquisition workforce management data are collected and stored in the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) Workforce Data Mart. Data Mart is a centralized data warehouse that 
serves as a single repository for all acquisition workforce data collected from the 
Military Personnel Data System, DCPDS, and other external sources. Data Mart is 
used for workforce counts, human capital strategic plans, course demand 
management, and for the monitoring of certification rates. The DoD conducts 
workforce forecasting based on acquisition workforce information. Forecasting of 
gain and loss levels was supported by RAND and an internal workforce forecasting 
tool (GAO, 2010). 
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GAO reports over the previous ten years capture the evolution of DoD 
workforce planning initiatives. In January 2001, the GAO designated strategic 
human capital management as a government-wide high-risk area in its High-Risk 
Series because ―serious human capital shortfalls are eroding the ability of many 
agencies, and threatening the ability of others, to economically, efficiently, and 
effectively perform their missions‖ (GAO, 2001a, p. 72). The major problem is not 
federal employees but rather the ―lack of a consistent strategic approach to 
marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize 
government performance and ensure its accountability‖ (GAO, 2002a, p. 4).  In a 
prelude to a human capital model, this report outlined four pervasive human capital 
challenges as follows: (1) leadership, continuity, and succession planning; (2) 
strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment; (3) acquiring and 
developing staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs; and (4) 
creating results-oriented organizational cultures. These became the four 
cornerstones of the GAO’s model. It outlined three immediate steps to manage 
human capital as follows: (1) identify and make use of all appropriate administrative 
authorities (available in Human Resource Flexibilities and Authorities in the Federal 
Government, OPM, 2008); (2) pursue incremental legislative reforms to supply 
additional tools and flexibilities to hire, manage, and retrain personnel, particularly in 
critical occupations; and (3) identify the kinds of needed comprehensive legislative 
reforms which place greater emphasis on skills, knowledge, and performance in 
connection with employment and compensation decisions (GAO, 2002a, p. 5). The 
report goes on to identify eight critical success factors associated with the four 
human capital cornerstones mentioned earlier (commitment to human capital 
management; role of the human capital function; integration and alignment; data-
driven human capital decisions; targeted investments in people; human capital 
approaches tailored to meet organizational needs, empowerment and inclusiveness; 





The RAND Corporation has been actively involved in identifying the 
challenges of workforce planning in the DoD. The collection of RAND studies is 
noteworthy for the identification of both quantitative and qualitative gaps in workforce 
planning.  
One such report titled An Operational Process for Workforce Planning is one 
of the products of a project undertaken for the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) within RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (Emmerichs, Marcum, & 
Robbert, 2004b). Beginning with the recommendations of the DoD Acquisition 2005 
Task Force’s final report, Shaping the Civilian Acquisition Workforce of the Future 
(OSD, 2000), which called for the development and implementation of needs-based 
human resource performance plans for the DoD civilian workforce, RAND developed 
a user’s guide for those conducting workforce planning within acquisition 
organizations. The methodology is described primarily in terms of its application at a 
business unit level based on a review of workforce planning in both governmental 
and private-sector organizations. The report summary states that ―workforce 
planning is an organizational activity intended to ensure that investment in human 
capital results in the timely capability to effectively carry out the organization’s 
strategic intent‖ (Emmerichs et al., 2004b, p. ix). Strategic intent is usually implicit 
and is an expression of what the leadership believes the business of the 
organization is and how that business will be accomplished through goals, guiding 
principles, and/or strategies. ―A major task for workforce planners is to identify 
explicitly those elements of strategic intent that workforce characteristics help 
accomplish‖ (Emmerichs et al., 2004b, p. ix). In addition to identifying the major 
purposes of workforce planning (the goal-oriented view), the structural view presents 
four questions central to workforce planning: 
1. What critical workforce characteristics will the organization need in the 
future to accomplish its strategic intent, and what is the desired 
distribution of these characteristics? 
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2. What is the distribution—in today’s workforce—of the workforce 
characteristics needed for the future? 
3. If the organization maintains current policies and programs, what 
distribution of characteristics will the future workforce possess? 
4. What changes to human resource management policies and practices, 
resource decisions, and other actions will eliminate or alleviate gaps 
(overages or shortages) between the future desired distribution and the 
projected future inventory? (Emmerichs et al., 2004b, p. xi) 
The process view proposes a four-step process to workforce planning, which 
relies on comprehensive data and sophisticated models utilized in an ongoing 
dialogue among the business unit’s senior leaders. Of particular note is the 
identification of the need for ―sophisticated workload models (which help translate 
expected workloads into requirements for workers) and inventory projection models 
(which depict how the expected composition of a workforce will change over time)‖ 
(Emmerichs et al., 2004b, p. x.).  
Emmerichs et al. (2004b) illustrate the important distinction between a model 
that predicts the changes in the size and competencies of the workforce over time 
versus one that models the work requirements that the organization will be expected 
to perform (ideally with advance notice).  
Emmerichs et al. (2004b) found that accurate and relevant data are vital for 
the successful operation of workforce models. They recommended that while 
workforce planning is often best carried out at the business unit level, the 
identification of data, and the collection of data, is best accomplished at the 
headquarters level to ensure that comparable data are being used at the various 
business units. The authors also recommended that models be developed at the 
headquarters level for use at the business level to ensure that a standardized 
approach is being utilized. 
Finally, Emmerichs et al.(2004b)  provide a cautionary recommendation that 
the identification of workload factors and the implementation of any model be 
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conducted through discussions with stakeholders that allow qualitative information to 
be considered in addition to raw numbers.  
Although we do not argue that facilitated dialogue is the only means of 
carrying out the process, based on our experience (and as part of a similar 
process focused on organizational behavior), we believe it produces a 
synergy not available through a mechanistic procedure. (Emmerichs et al., 
2004b, p. 36) 
Another notable RAND study within its National Defense Research Institute is 
a report titled Civilian Workforce Planning in the Department of Defense, published 
in 2006. The study sought to describe the existing workforce planning process at 
individual military installations in order to identify challenges to workforce planning at 
these bases and to consider options for DoD-wide workforce planning and OSD 
support for installation-level planning. The four basic steps of the model developed 
by the study effort are: (1) forecast workforce requirements (staffing levels and 
competencies demanded in the future), (2) project workforce supply, (3) identify 
gaps between supply and demand, and (4) develop strategies that address key 
gaps. Six military sites were selected for in-depth analysis (Gates, Eibner & Keating, 
2006, pp. xiv-xv). Only one base selected was an Army site. Noting that the DoD 
lacked a department-wide workforce planning process, RAND’s study recognized 
that the DoD does possess a set of resources that would serve as a starting point for 
such planning. The Defense Civilian Personnel Data System (DCPDS) is used by 
installations for some types of supply analysis, but the key limitation of the existing 
data is a lack of information on skills and competencies (Gates et al., 2006, p. xvi). 
The study makes several recommendations to the OSD concerning its support of 
local-level workforce planning efforts—including an improvement in existing data 
systems and their use, promotion of the collection of requirements data, the creation 
of a more meaningful gap analysis process, and a move to better integrate 
workforce planning and budgeting processes (Gates et al., 2006, pp. xxii-xxiii). 
Although not specifically focused on contracting personnel, the study does provide 
insight into the issues associated with projecting workforce requirements and supply 
as well as gap analysis. 
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For the purposes of my research, it is useful to highlight the importance of 
step 1: forecast demand—or estimating staffing levels and competencies required in 
the future workforce. The outputs of demand planning in this context are workforce 
requirements.  These requirements reflect the required number of positions and 
competencies that the workers must have. It is worth noting that throughout the 
literature review there is an emphasis placed on having not only the correct number 
of workers, but that the correct number of workers have the correct skills or 
competencies as well (Gates et al., 2006). 
The findings of Gates et al. (2006) indicate that successful completion of the 
demand analysis step is essential to successful workforce planning. In this study, the 
researchers found demand analysis to be much more challenging in DoD 
organizations due to the difficulty that organizations have in estimating customer 
demand. Furthermore, organizations varied significantly in their ability to translate 
customer demand into estimates of required workforce (Gates et al., 2006).  
Gates et al. discovered that unlike some non-governmental agencies with 
fewer manpower restrictions, customer demand is not the only factor that managers 
must consider in assessing DoD workforce demand.  
In the DoD, local managers face constraints on the total number of civilian 
work years they are allowed, as well as the total wage bill for civilian 
personnel. These additional constraints complicate gaps analysis, because 
local managers must be conscious of at least two gaps: that between the 
required (the estimated workforce needed or required to accomplish the 
organization’s goals) workforce and the workforce supply, and that between 
the budgeted (the workforce that can be supported with resources that have 
been budgeted for civilian personnel in that organization) workforce and the 
workforce supply. (Gates et al., 2006 p. 47) 
In summary, demand analysis involves two important types of data:  
 projections of customer demand and  




In other words, there must be a set of workload factors or process times that allow 
the researcher to interpolate the raw demand information into workforce 
requirements. 
The researchers found that a lack of data, both on the skills and 
competencies of the workforce and on customer demand, limits workforce planning 
throughout the DoD. In their assessment, additional data collection would be 
required to support a DoD-wide demand analysis, and a gap analysis in particular. 
However, they found it important to weigh the cost of data collection, as the cost of 
data collection may sometimes outweigh the benefits. Leaders must assess both the 
cost of collecting the data and the value that the data bring to workload and 
performance assessment. Such an assessment will allow leaders to select data that 
provide the best value to the organization per the cost spent to collect the data.  
In a report titled The Defense Acquisition Workforce: An Analysis of 
Personnel Trends Relevant to Policy, 1993-2006, the RAND Corporation addressed 
planning issues involving both the civilian and military acquisition workforce. This 
study was undertaken at the request of the Director, Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (AT&L), Human Capital Initiatives (HCI) in the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (AT&L). Using the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
as a primary source of inventory demographic data, RAND tracked acquisition 
employees from late 1991 to late 2006. The report makes the following 
recommendations: (1) better definition and tracking of the acquisition workforce 
would improve workforce planning; (2) more detailed analysis of the current 
acquisition workforce and historical trends could yield additional insight; and (3) 
workforce analysis is only one step in an overall strategic human capital planning 
effort (Gates et al., 2008, p. xi). The study presents an acquisition workforce 
inventory projection model that can be used to project the characteristics and size of 
the workforce in the future based on the size of the current inventory and historical 
turnover information (p. 24). The key workforce factor used in the model is year of 
service. Starting with a beginning inventory and applying continuation rates 
(employees expected to remain in the workforce for an additional year) and gain and 
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separation/recategorization rates, the model presents how the workforce might 
appear at the end of each successive fiscal year. This model is available to DoD 
workforce planning personnel. 
In 2009, Gates authored the RAND study Shining a Spotlight on the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce—Again. The study observed that in almost every instance that 
critics have criticized the acquisition workforce, they consistently identify its size, 
quality, and effectiveness as the key contributing factors to the observed problems 
(Gates, 2009). 
One of Gates’ three major focus areas in this report is of particular importance 
to this literature review. Specifically, her finding of a constant assessment that ―the 
current workforce is too small to meet current workload‖ (Gates, 2009, p. 4). Gates 
notes that the Gansler Commission Report attributes recent contracting scandals to 
a lack of growth in the size of the Army contracting workforce combined with the 
exploding growth in the acquisition workload (Gansler, 2007, p. 30). However, 
Gansler uses the proxy of total contracting actions as the measure for workload, as 
opposed to a more detailed analysis. Furthermore, Gates points to Report of the 
Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the 
United States Congress,  subsequently referred to in this chapter as the ―Section 
1423 Report,‖ which stresses that the demands on the federal acquisition workforce 
have grown both in number and complexity since 1995 (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 
2007).  
Gates concludes that the key drivers of the increasing demands include:  
the complexity of service contracting, which is growing as a share of all 
government contracting; the fact that the number of transactions is no longer 
a good measure of workload; and the fact that best-value procurement 
approaches are substantially more complex than lowest-price contracting 
approaches. (Gates, 2009 p. 4) 
The Section 1423 Report (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007) finds that 
workforce issues are only part of the problem. For example, in discussing the 
barriers to effective requirements determination, the Section 1423 Report 
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(Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 7) not only points toward a strained workforce 
that lacks the requisite market expertise, but also to other factors that contribute to 
poor outcomes, such as a culture that emphasizes ―getting to award,‖ budgetary 
pressures, time pressures, and unclear roles and responsibilities—particularly in the 
use of interagency or government-wide contracts. Gates concludes that:  
the demands placed on the acquisition workforce have outstripped its 
capacity. And while the current workforce has remained stable in the new 
millennium, there were substantial reductions in the 1990s accompanied with 
a lack of attention to providing the training necessary to those remaining to 
effectively operate the more complex buying climate. (Gates, 2009, p. 5) 
The RAND investigation found that given the lack of available information on 
workforce requirements, size, quality, and mix that it was not possible to assess 
whether more workers, more highly skilled workers, or a different mix of workers 
would improve acquisition outcomes (Gates, 2009). 
To conclude the review of the RAND report literature, I return to the questions 
I asked at the outset: Is the defense acquisition workforce really too small? And if so, 
what basis will we use to calculate the gaps and apportion resources to mitigate the 
gaps? Gates responds,  
To answer this question, one needs information about how many people are 
needed to accomplish the work (workforce demand) and how many people 
are currently part of the AW (acquisition workforce) (workforce supply). No 
systematic data are currently available or referenced in workforce critiques on 
defense acquisition workforce demand [emphasis added]. This is a key 
barrier to answering the question posed above since a characterization of the 
required workforce must anchor any assessment of whether the current 
workforce is too small or too large. Data on workforce supply exist, but they 
have serious limitations for accurately depicting trends in the size of the 
defense AW. Two limitations are of particular importance: (1) varying 
definitions of the organic (military and civilian) defense AW and (2) the 
absence of DoD-wide information on the number of contractors in the defense 
AW. (Gates, 2009, p. 15)  
Federal Acquisition Institute 
The Federal Acquisition Institute (FAI) focuses on establishing guidance and 
support for the federal acquisition community. A review of FAI reports and initiatives 
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has resulted in the identification of practices and tools, which could be leveraged in 
DoD acquisition workforce planning. 
The FAI has taken a leadership position on broad-based competency 
assessment. The FAI issued a report presenting the results of its 2007 Contracting 
Workforce Competencies Survey. The survey targeted the GS-1102 series in the 
civilian agencies, including military personnel working outside the DoD performing 
contract specialist duties. Approximately 48% of the target population responded to 
the survey. The report analyzed proficiency levels regarding both general business 
and technical contracting competencies in various segments of the workforce—
including educational level, years of experience, age, and training levels. The report 
stated that overall, contracting workforce technical competencies are at expected 
levels. ―Of the 17 technical competencies surveyed, gaps requiring attention were 
identified in project management, defining requirements, and financial management. 
General business competency gaps were identified in influencing/negotiating and 
oral communications‖ (FAI, 2007, p. 2).  
In 2008 the FAI conducted a follow-up competency survey, 2008 Acquisition 
Workforce Competencies Survey Results Report and Survey Content, which 
revealed that the average response improved for each of the contracting 
competency areas (as well as for the contracting officer technical representative and 
for the program manager; FAI, 2009). An objective critique of the FAI competency 
assessment offers that any time self-reported competency assessments are 
conducted there is the risk of self-report bias and assessment inflation. Conducting 
objective interview or scenario based assessments with a sample of the population 
and comparing them to self-assessment scores would provide useful validation 
baselines regarding the accuracy of the self-reported competency assessments. 
A year earlier, the FAI published the Acquisition Workforce Human Capital 
Plan (FAI, 2007). This document provided outlines, templates, and other guidance to 
assist agencies in the writing of Human Capital Plans. While much of the guide 
strives to address workforce imbalances and skill gaps, portions of the guide provide 
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reminders that workload assessment is also important. For example, one Human 
Capital Planning Strategy is to ―ensure that the acquisition workforce human capital 
plan is used to set priorities for resource allocation, workload distribution and funding 
requests, within the context of the agency’s strategic plan‖ (FAI, 2007 p. 11). This 
strategy clearly requires that an assessment of agency workload occur before the 
workforce strategy can be adequately developed and applied. Under this plan, each 
agency was to establish a comprehensive model and overall process for acquisition 
workforce planning that addresses nine areas including, of note, ―projected 
workforce imbalances and skill gaps; and workload analysis‖ (FAI, 2007 p. 13). If 
agencies are to complete workload analysis as part of this plan, it seems reasonable 
that a workload assessment tool should be made available. 
In 2009, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy addressed the need for 
workload models in the Acquisition Workforce Development Strategic Plan for 
Civilian Agencies—FY 2010–2014 (OFPP, 2009). To assist civilian agencies with 
preparing workforce plans, OFPP provided project model assistance along with the 
FAI:  
Because agency missions and acquisition activities differ considerably, there 
is no simple formula that can relate the size and composition of an agency’s 
acquisition activity to its ideal workforce size. In developing a target acquisition 
workforce profile, agencies should examine their current acquisition management 
practices and determine where performance is hindered by insufficient resources. In 
particular, agencies should plan to increase the size of their acquisition workforce so 
long as the cost-savings and performance improvement benefits to taxpayers from 
better acquisition management exceed the cost of the additional acquisition 
employees. Additionally, FAI will develop and maintain an online toolkit for use by 
the agencies that will include various projection methodologies that agencies can 
use as part of their workforce analysis (OFPP, 2009, p. 9). 
FAI has since established an online community that shares workload 
projection tools. In keeping with the OFPP’s assessment that the most appropriate 
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model may vary by agency, seven different model types have been made available. 
The models available include project-based, program-based, muti-dimensional, 
regression, volume-based, transaction, and conceptual-combination models. The 
specific characteristics of these models will be discussed further in the analysis 
section of this report. 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
Two major areas of influence (the Section 1423 Report and the Acquisition 
Workforce Development Strategic Plan for Civilian Agencies—FY 2010–2014) by the 
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) have been discussed in the previous 
literature review sections. A more in-depth discussion of the Section 1423 Report is 
presented here. 
The Acquisition Advisory Panel was authorized by Section 1423 of the 
Services Acquisition Reform Act of 2003. The panel was charged to review and 
recommend any necessary changes to acquisition laws and regulations as well as 
government-wide acquisition policies. In the Acquisition Advisory Panel’s resulting 
report to the OFPP in 2007, they identified that in addition to the areas they were 
asked to review, they found that a review of the acquisition workforce was also 
required as it would be difficult to effectively improve other areas without taking 
significant action regarding the acquisition workforce. Specifically, they found that  
The federal acquisition workforce is an essential key to success in achieving 
the government’s missions. Procurement is an increasingly central part of the 
government’s activities. Without a workforce that is qualitatively and 
quantitatively adequate and adapted to its mission, the procurement reforms 
of the last decade cannot achieve their potential, and successful federal 
procurement cannot be achieved. (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 330) 
Other findings of the panel included that the complexity of the federal 
acquisition system as a whole has markedly increased since the 1980s; that few 
agencies have systematically assessed their acquisition workforce; that procurement 
obligations grew by 60% in the past five years; that the qualitative nature of the 
procurement activity has also changed, placing greater demands on the acquisition 
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workforce for capability, training, time, and sophistication; that a significant shift from 
the acquisition of goods to the acquisition of services has occurred, placing 
additional demands on the acquisition workforce, in requirements definition, contract 
formation process, and in contract management (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007). 
The panel also identified the changing nature of contracting processes as 
having a significant impact on the acquisition workforce. For example, the use of 
interagency awards and schedules to meet requirements has often allowed for the 
timely issuance of agreements, which allows a strained workforce to meet customer 
needs. However, the use of these schedules has contributed to other problems 
occurring from the failure of agencies to fully develop requirements, the failure to 
secure competition in using these vehicles, or the failure to manage contract 
performance under these vehicles (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007). 
Other findings included the increased complexity involved with utilizing best-
value awards as opposed to lowest price awards and the additional burden of past-
performance assessment prior to award. In addition, the panel also identified that, 
both government-wide and agency-specific efforts to respond to the new 
challenges of today’s acquisition system have focused on the nature of the 
skills required for success in today’s contracting environment. They have not 
ascertained the number of personnel possessing those skills that are required 
given the level of present or future agency acquisition activity. (Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 366) 
The panel recognized the progress made in competency assessment by the 
FAI, but noted that the reports had not assessed workload demands for these 
competencies for the future, nor had they attempted at that time to assess the 
degree to which members of the existing federal procurement workforce possessed 
these capabilities (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007). 
The panel recommended that Agency Chief Acquisition Officers should be 
responsible for measuring and predicting, to the extent possible, the agency’s needs 
for procurement personnel. Further they stated clearly that ―it is not sufficient simply 
to try to retain and manage existing personnel resources. Resources needed must 
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be identified and gaps between needed resources and available resources must be 
forthrightly acknowledged‖ (Acquisition Advisory Panel, 2007, p. 374). 
The findings in the Section 1423 Report have had a direct influence on the 
actions taken by the OFPP to shape workforce planning and provide agencies with 
the tools that they need to positively affect their strategic human capital.  
Department of Defense (Including Army Reports) 
Pertinent to this research is the early warning signal regarding the acquisition 
workforce that was provided in a DoD report entitled Shaping the Civilian Acquisition 
Workforce of the Future (OSD, 2000). The report provided data describing a 
potential mass exodus from the DoD acquisition workforce and offered 32 significant 
recommendations to enhance the ability of management to address the problems 
identified.  In 2005, the DoD published the Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan 
2006–2010. In this plan, the DoD laid out a goal to ―ensure the Department 
systematically plans and forecasts workforce requirements to support the DoD 
mission with a trained and ready civilian force‖ (DoD, 2005, p. 11). It is interesting to 
note, however, that none of the proposed performance measures for this goal 
suggest that the appropriate size of the organization be determined. Demographic 
and trend data such as retention, turnover, staff ratios, customer satisfaction, 
training dollars, and competency gaps are proposed measures, but workload and 
appropriate size are not (DoD, 2005, p. D-2).  
Subsequently, Section 851 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
required the DoD to have a separate section in its Civilian Human Capital Strategic 
Plan (HCSP) on the acquisition workforce. The high visibility of this workforce is 
made clear because it is the only workforce that has been required to have a stand-
alone, DoD-wide Human Capital Strategic Plan (Gates, 2009). 
Perhaps the most well-known recent report related to Army Contracting is the 
2007 Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary 
Operations report, widely referred to as ―The Gansler Report‖ (Gansler, 2007). This 
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commission, empanelled by the Secretary of the Army, authored a forthright 
assessment of the impact on the Army of reducing the number of contracts 
specialists and simultaneously increasing the contracting workload by seven times. 
However, even this thorough assessment of the basis for some failures of Army 
expeditionary contracting uses a cursory proxy for ―workload,‖ defining it as the 
number of contract actions completed. While it is true that a seven-fold increase in 
even the most simplified workload measure will clearly stress a system, the obvious 
complexities and variability that occur when using completed contract actions as a 
workload measure leaves much to be desired (Gansler, 2007). 
The AT&L Human Capital Strategic Plan (version 3.0) is a useful benchmark 
for human capital goals and initiatives in the DoD (USD[AT&L], 2007), although, 
some of this plan has been overcome by the recent suspension of the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS) and the arrival of the new workforce 
management tools described later in this section. 
More recently, the DoD has published the DOD Strategic Human Capital Plan 
Update—The Defense Acquisition Workforce (DoD, 2010). This document is 
prepared to meet the statutory reporting requirements established in multiple 
National Defense Authorization Acts. As such, it provides a tremendous amount of 
information on workforce demographics and strategies.  
This report provides the best rationale found in this literature review for 
increasing the size of the acquisition workforce. Specifically, it states,  
The increase of approximately 20,000 [employees] will rebalance the organic 
acquisition workforce to better address inherently governmental and other 
critical functions. This will help mitigate the imbalance created by significant 
outsourcing of acquisition functions since the end of the Cold War. The DOD 
target to increase the size of the acquisition workforce was based on an 
integrated assessment of the following:  
1. Alignment with the President’s acquisition improvement initiatives and 
Department acquisition reform objectives;  
2. Congressional engagement and perspectives on increasing the size of 
the defense acquisition workforce;  
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3. Senior leadership judgment relative to the need for a larger defense 
acquisition workforce to include Component and Functional Leader 
bottoms-up analysis;  
4. The need to improve contract management and the Department’s 
oversight capability;  
5. Assessment of acquisition workforce decline since the mid 1990’s;  
6. The need to grow the organic workforce capability by rebalancing the 
Total Force mix;  
7. An assessment of workload demand based on the dramatic increase in 
annual spend levels since 2001;  
8. Results of the Dayton Aerospace SACOM reviews of major program 
offices in the Air Force and Navy;  
9. Air Force assessment of their workforce assigned to major programs;  
10. DOD competency assessment and bottoms-up review conducted by 
OSD and Component contracting leaders;  
11. Internal DOD analysis of a variety of RAND studies on the acquisition 
workforce;  
12. Numerous external studies, including GAO reports, which 
recommended DOD increase the size of the acquisition workforce;  
13. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Structures and Capability review 
(Section 814, NDAA FY06);  
14. Firsthand feedback from field level acquisition organizations. (DoD, 
2010, p. 2-10) 
These 14 subjective points serve as an argument that an increase in the size 
of the acquisition workforce will contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of 
mission performance. However, while a review of the open-source literature listed 
above found arguments for increasing the size of the acquisition workforce in 
general, no objective basis for the precise increase of 20,000 acquisition workforce 
employees was found. 
Also pertinent to this research is the discussion of five planning tools 
discussed in the update report above. The first tool discussed in the update is the 
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Defense Acquisition Workforce Data Mart, which allows for real-time reporting of 
workforce count, certification level, etc. The second tool discussed is the PB23 
Planned/Budgeted Acquisition Workforce tool, which shows by functional area the 
planned and budgeted future years. This tool is an important reminder that workforce 
is often driven by budget and vacancies on manning documents, rather than by 
workload. Should agencies conduct a workload analysis and find that workforce 
needs require adjustments in the Fiscal Year Defense Plan, they may submit 
updates for consideration. The third tool discussed in the update is the Inventory 
Projection Model. This RAND developed tool allows users to adjust planning factors 
to determine the impact of potential workforce policy changes on workforce size 
estimates. The fourth tool discussed, the Workforce Lifecycle Model (WLM), 
provides visual reports on three cohort groups: future (recent hires), mid-career, and 
senior-career groups. This tool allows for the analysis of demographic data within 
each of these groups. Finally, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Competency 
Initiative seeks to validate enterprise-wide acquisition competency models for each 
functional area. The resulting models enable workforce assessments, skill set gap 
analysis, the updating of training and performance support assets, and other 
workforce applications (DoD, 2010, p. 2–4). However, a review of this report found 
no mention of a tool to determine the workload of acquisition organizations. 
One of the 14 sources cited as the basis for the 20,000 person increase in the 
acquisition workforce is the 2007 report published by the Defense Acquisition 
University, Defense Acquisition Structures and Capabilities Review (DAU, 2007). 
This report illustrates the demographic summary and trends in the acquisition 
workforce. However, it does not address workload assessment, other than to 
observe that 
measuring DoD acquisition workloads is an extremely complex task. 
Seemingly straightforward measures like the number of programs or contract 
actions are not necessarily reflective of the actual workload. For example, a 
major acquisition program requires considerably more work in terms of 
systems development, program management, and contract administration 




In spite of complex workloads, varying budgets, and changing mission 
priorities, the Department conducts both budgeting and planning efforts that 
affect the future acquisition workforce. (DAU, 2007, p. 3–9) 
Another of the 14 sources cited as the basis for the increase of 20,000 people 
in the workforce, is the 2006 Department of Defense report, the Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment Project. This report makes extensive recommendations 
regarding changes to acquisition processes and recommends to ―immediately 
increase the number of federal employees focused on critical skill areas, such as 
program management, system engineering and contracting‖ (DoD, 2006, p.12). 
However, there is no finding or recommendation relative to workload assessment. 
DoD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 250 of the DoD Civilian Personnel 
Management System provides the overall policy guidelines and model program 
information regarding civilian personnel in the DoD. This instruction requires OSD 
Functional Community Managers (OFCMs) to 1) analyze ―current and projected 
mission requirements (both expeditionary and non-expeditionary), environmental 
influences, attrition and retirement trends, and workload forecasts to identify current 
and future community manpower requirements‖ and to 2) ―conduct inventory 
analysis of the numbers in the community against projected manpower needs to 
identify workforce gaps‖ (DoD, 2008, p. 6). 
The U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency (USAMAA) at Fort Belvoir, 
Virginia, is responsible for providing assistance with the development of workload 
models and manpower policy. They provide several definitions which are of 
assistance to this report. USAMAA defines workload as: the major output, product 
produced, or service provided by a working element, normally a work center 
(USAMAA, 2009). The unit of measurement for workload is equal to the number of 
items produced or to the amount of service provided (called a workload count). 
Workload is further defined as the ―amount of work assigned/directed to and 
expected to be accomplished by a worker or unit of workers in a given time period‖ 
(Army, 2006, p.13). To determine the number of employees or Full Time Equivalents 
(FTEs) required to meet the predicted workload, the Army divides total cumulative 
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organization workload hours by 1,740, the baseline standard for annual production 
hours per FTE (USAMAA, 2009). 
USAMAA defines a workload driver as a programmable metric that has a 
meaningful influence on the amount of workload (output) that a work center needs to 
generate (USAMAA, 2009). A final definition to be considered here is manpower 
requirements, defined as human resources needed to accomplish a specified 
workload of organizations, expressed as number of people per time period (Army, 
2006). 
Thus, when predicting manpower requirements, the use of either total 
workload or workload drivers is appropriate. Either way, a calculation of the primary 
tasks associated with completing a major function are tabulated, multiplied by the 
standard time required for the task, or per accomplishment times (PAT), and then 
summed to compute the total workload time. When divided by the Army annual 
availability work standard of 1,740 discussed previously, the result is the number of 
FTEs required (USAMAA, 2009). This process assumes that the average 
organization member approximates the mean time to perform tasks.  In 
organizations with more senior, experienced personnel one might reasonably 
assume that the time required per task would be lower than when compared with a 
less experienced staff, in which case the required time would be higher. The formula 
above does not take this factor into consideration (Army, 2009). 
The Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies 
The Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies (CAPS) sponsored by the 
Institute of Supply Management, works with industry supply management executives 
and academics to develop and share knowledge and best practices. It conducts 
recurring surveys and publishes regular reports on key areas of procurement and 
supply management. These publications allow commercial purchasing organizations 
to compare themselves with other organizations at a macro level as well as with 
organizations within their industry sector. Based on surveys of procurement 
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organizations, the CAPS provides a snapshot overview of 20 different key 
performance indicators (Wade, 2010). 
Among the 20 industry variables that the CAPS tracks related to procurement, 
there are 11 that apply to both the public and private sectors:  
1. The total dollars spent by a procurement organization as a percent of 
total firm budget (how much of an organization’s needs are acquired 
via contract and what is procurement’s relative impact/importance to 
the total organization);  
2. Supply management operating expense as a percent of total spend 
(how much does it cost to spend each dollar of supplies or services 
that the organization procures); Congressional engagement and 
perspectives on increasing the size of the defense acquisition 
workforce;  
3. Supply management operating expense per supply management 
employee (the total cost—pay, training, benefits, etc.—of the average 
member of the workforce); 
4. Total spend per supply management employee (contract dollars 
awarded by the average procurement specialist); 
5. Annual spend on professional training per supply management 
employee; 
6. Professional training hours completed per supply management 
employee; 
7. Supply management group retention rate; 
8. Cost reduction savings as a percent of total spend; 
9. Cost avoidance savings as a percent of total spend; 
10. average order/action processing cost; and 
11. average cycle-time (in days) from requirement approval to issuance of 
order/contract. (Institute of Supply Management, 2010) 
 
Some of the interesting benchmarks in the 2006 CAPS report showed that the 
supply management operating expense per employee was $107,803.  Operating 
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expenses per employee are calculated in different ways depending on the firm, but 
the measure includes employee salary at a minimum.  The report also indicated that  
the number of supply management full time employees (FTEs), as a percent of all 
organization employees, was 1.1%. The breakout of supply management 
organizations by functional type included 23% in contract management, 25% in 
strategic sourcing, and 25% in transactional purchasing (IOMA, 2006, p. 18).  
While industry practices vary from federal procurement practices, the industry 
response ranges and means provide useful benchmarks for organizations interested 
in comparing their results to determine where they stand relative to organizations in 
similar industries, such as the automotive or aerospace sectors.  
Research from Other Non-Government Sources 
Published research focused on measuring procurement organization 
workload and performance dates back to at least 1936. In that year, Lewis (1936) 
published Standards of Purchasing Performance in which he concluded that 
quantitative measures of procurement performance were not only possible but also 
useful.  
Kudrna (1972) established that purchasing managers need precise methods 
to evaluate staff performance to allow for equitable distribution of workload. Cost 
reduction measures were developed by dividing the cost reduction in a specific 
period of time by the total purchasing spend in that period. An alternative measure of 
cost avoidance was also developed.  The total amount of expenses prevented was 
divided by total purchases in a period. Kudrna also stressed that measuring the 
quality of the output was also important to consider, suggesting that the number of 
claims and orders rejected in a period would be useful proxies. He recommended 
that workload be assessed by assigning time units to types of activities (e.g., 
purchase order = 2 units; change notice = 1 unit). By dividing the total spend a buyer 
awarded by the time units of work completed by that buyer, a measure of buyer 
performance was developed (Kudrna, 1972). 
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Monczka and Carter (1978) produced a comprehensive set of 20 
performance measures via a survey of 18 industry and government agencies. The 
types of measures found to be in use by procurement offices included (1) price 
effectiveness (the price achieved versus the amount budgeted for a procurement), 
(2) workload (workload received, current backlog of work, work completed), (3) cost 
savings (cost reduction and cost avoidance), (4) administration and control (number 
of staff required for workload), (5) vendor quality (cost of quality measures), and (6) 
efficiency (work accomplished per procurement specialist) (Monczka & Carter, 
1978). 
The two most important areas of measurement for this literature review are 
workload assessment and administration (Monczka & Carter, 1978). Workload 
measures in use sought to identify three key areas of work: work expected, work in 
progress, and work completed. Common methods of counting workload included the 
receipt of purchase requests, purchase requests in process, and protests received 
for processing in government agencies. Organizations converted cumulative 
workload measures to the number of days work on hand by dividing the cumulative 
workload backlog by the standard average work-day output. Most organizations 
used multiple work-completed measures, and ―none thought that any one measure 
gave a complete picture of actual workload‖ (Monczka & Carter, 1978, p. 38).  
In the area of administrative control, several findings are of particular interest 
to this report. The most common measure found to be in use to determine required 
staffing was to adjust the staff budget from the previous year depending on the 
budget, business forecast, or workload estimate of the next year. In this type of 
estimate, no formal methods were used to relate workload to headcount (Monczka & 
Carter, 1978). An alternative method is the use of a control ratio. In this method, the 
purchasing organization’s staff budget is calculated as a percentage of another 
measure, usually planned dollar expenditures. The calculation is accomplished by 
applying a ratio based on historical information to the base measure.  
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A third method identified for calculating required staff is to develop a workload 
standard for each buyer which would represent the average amount of work 
expected to be performed by each member of the organization. The expected 
incoming workload would then be divided by that standard, resulting in the required 
number of buyers (Monczka & Carter, 1978). A final method discussed was the 
assignment of the number of hours, or process time, to different types of activities, 
followed by the estimation of the workload in each of those activity types in order to 
ascertain the number of buyer hours required for the coming time period (Monczka & 
Carter, 1978).  
In attempting to determine the best overall method, Monczka and Carter 
(1978) found that the answer was somewhere between control ratios and time 
standards. 
It appears reasonable to use aggregate standards (e.g., actions or spend per 
buyer) to help establish the necessary staffing levels. The control ratio is often 
out of phase with actual workload, and detailed time standards do not appear 
to yield results that are sufficiently superior in most purchasing departments 
to justify their development. (Monczka & Carter, 1978, p. 39) 
In a study of 17 government procurement agencies at the county level, 
McCampell and Slaich (1995) found that two benchmarks provided insight into 
buying organization performance. The first measure is the average dollar volume 
obligated annually per professional staff member (buyer). The second measure is 
the mean cost per dollar obligated (McCampbell & Slaich, 1995). 
The dollars-per-buyer measure was found to be superior to orders- or action-
per–buyer measures due to an absence of what an order or action was defined as 
from organization to organization. The variability in these definitions substantiates 
the argument that the weights applied to variables should be made at lower 
organizational levels, as agency-wide weights and definitions would not be 
appropriate or reasonable for all contracting organizations within an agency. 
Furthermore, this measure could be manipulated by pursuing inefficient methods 
(issuing multiple orders rather than pursuing a more efficient consolidated order 
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process). Auditors may conclude that such a reduction in orders may provide a 
logical basis for staff reductions (McCampbell & Slaich, 1995). The study found that 
the average dollar volume obligated annually was $10.7 million, which is in the range 
found in the CAPS benchmarks ($3.4 million in aerospace to $47.9 million for food 
service; McCampbell & Slaich, 1995, p. 34).  
The cost per dollar obligated (CPDO) benchmark was found to be particularly 
useful to the government sector. It is based on available information and it is easy to 
understand. The authors of this study also found that dollar-based calculations 
would be less likely to cause government auditors to mistake increased efficiency 
(fewer orders) as a cause for staff reductions (McCampbell & Slaich, 1995). CPDO 
would also be of interest to organizations pursuing consolidated buying strategies, 
as larger organizations using centralized or strategic sourcing processes are likely to 
achieve efficiencies in procurement. The limiting factor of applying CPDO in such an 
environment is that strategic sourcing efforts often take a great deal of upfront work, 
and then these efforts actually serve to reduce total dollars obligated, which has a 
negative impact on the measure. Another caveat would be to ensure that the 
measure is used in a competitive environment (to ensure award prices are not kept 
high to improve the metric) and in an aggregated fashion, rather than applying the 
measure to individual buyers (aggregation should ensure there is no skewing by 
individuals attempting to pursue ―bad buying‖ practices; McCampbell & Slaich, 
1995). 
The study found that the mean CPDO was $0.0104, which is in the range 
found in the CAPS benchmarks, $0.002 to $0.05 (McCampbell & Slaich, 1995, p. 
34).  
Also in 1995, Black developed the Workload Index Model and published it in 
Measuring Relative Productivity and Staffing Levels in a Federal Procurement 
Office. Black’s model is an analytical attempt to compute a workload index that 
accounts for differences in the types of work and in the complexity of the work being 
performed (Black, 1995). Earlier models discussed used dollars obligated or orders 
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processed as the common basis for measurement. Black posits that non-weighted 
measures such as the average number of actions per employee, average dollars 
obligated per employee, and average days to process an action must be avoided 
(Black, 1995). His rationale is that these measures  
fail to account for the relative (weighted) differences in work tasks and staffing 
across offices examined. A small average number of procurements (or 
dollars) processed per staff member does not necessarily indicate poor 
performance; nor does a large average number of procurements (or dollars) 
processed per staff member necessarily indicate exceptional performance. 
(Black, 1995, p. 45) 
Black (1995) addresses such concerns by calculating a workload index that divides 
the weighted workload of an organization by the weighted staff of the organization. 
The weighted workload is calculated by applying weights (standard mean days or 
hours required to complete a task type) to 18 categories of work actions. The 
weighted staff is calculated by weighting staff by their government service grade 
levels. The logic is that 40 GS-14 grade contract managers should be able to 
complete contract actions in greater quality and quantity than 40 GS-13 grade 
contract managers (Black, 1995). The resulting index allows for the comparison of 
organizations based on how much they are producing with the type of staff they 
have available.  
Murphy, a faculty member at the Air Force Institute of Technology, teamed with 
Pearson and Siferd (1996) to develop a model for assessing procurement 
organization effectiveness. The model utilized four input measures: procurement 
organization operating expense (primarily driven by procurement staff salaries), total 
number of procurement staff, total number of administrative support staff, and the 
number of active suppliers (those providing goods or services within the past year). 
The model also utilized two organization output variables: procurement dollars, and 
procurement dollars as a percentage of total organization dollars (spend-to-budget 
ratio, discussed in more detail later in this section; Murphy, Pearson, & Siferd, 1996). 
The authors posit that by using a flexible weighting scheme that can accommodate 
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the varying importance of evaluation factors, managers are able to improve the 
assessment of organization performance (Murphy et al., 1996, p. 84).  
Many sources for this research effort emphasized either a crisis in human 
capital planning and utilization (Liebowitz, 2004) or the importance of understanding 
the new principles, concepts, and perspectives in the theory and practice of human 
capital management (Farazmand, 2007; Burud & Tumolo, 2004; Picot, Saunders, & 
Sweetman, 2007; Hartog & Maassen van den Brink, 2007; Boudreau & Ramstad, 
2007). Some sources also provide case studies, or ―stories,‖ that illustrate human 
capital assumptions, notions, attitudes, and beliefs (Kinter, Merrick, Morrison, & 
Voss, 1994; Burud & Tumolo, 2004).  
In 2004, a study of procurement benchmarks combined with the performance 
of organizations at various levels above and below benchmark means provided 
interesting results (IOMA, 2004). The study identified firms as ―world class‖ if they 
were either in the top quartile of both efficiency and effectiveness benchmarks, or in 
the top 10% of either of the two benchmarks (IOMA, 2004, p. 7). Procurement cost 
as a percentage of spend was 0.72% at world class firms compared to the 1.02% 
overall benchmark. However, these non-weighted measures may not capture the full 
picture if they are not presented in conjunction with a quality of output measure. This 
study sheds light on the impact of high quantity and quality output by finding that the 
cost to spend ratio is 0.92% for firms in the top 10% of effectiveness and 0.32% for 
those in the top 10% of efficiency (IOMA, 2004, p. 7). Therefore, although it may 
seem that higher quality would require higher cost, it does not appear to be the case. 
Other findings from this study include that world-class companies use 
relatively fewer people (54 FTEs per billion dollars spent versus the mean of 104 
FTEs per billion dollars spent and that they  invest more heavily in technology 
($24,308 per FTE as compared to the mean of $7,717 per FTE). Finally, world-class 
organizations shift investments and resources to higher value activities (16% of 
costs spent on order processing versus the 22% mean and 11% of costs to supplier 
management and development versus the 2% mean) (IOMA, 2004, p. 7). 
 33 
 
Nelson and Sorber (2006) ask the question, ―What is the right size for an 
agency’s acquisition workforce?‖ They revisit three benchmarks that can provide 
insight for federal managers. The first benchmark is the cost-to-spend ratio, which is 
―an indication of the efficiency of an organization’s operating costs, that is the lower 
the ratio, the less an agency spends for getting its procurement budget obligated‖ 
(Nelson & Sorber, 2006, p. 1). The second benchmark is the spend-per-employee 
ratio, which is ―an indication of the productivity of an organization’s employees; that 
is the higher the value the more procurement budget is obligated by each employee 
(Nelson & Sorber, 2006, p. 1). The third benchmark is the spend-to-budget ratio, 
which is ―a measure of the impact that procurement operations have on an agency’s 
mission, that is, the higher the percentage, the greater the impact‖ (Nelson & Sorber, 
2006, p. 2). For example, when dividing the total dollars put on contract by Army 
contracting by the total Army budget (personnel, operations cost, etc., plus 
contracts), you get a sense of the impact that the procurement organization has on 
the overall agency. The more you buy (rather than make or perform internally) the 
more important the procurement role is to the overall agency. 
Nelson and Sorber (2006) also point out that these measures provide useful 
starting points, but that they need to be considered within the total context of many 
other factors such as the employed policies and procedures, the quality of the 
process outputs, the training and development roles and responsibilities, the 
turnover, and the degree of customer alignment and satisfaction (Nelson & Sorber, 
2006, p. 2). 
A series of publications (Sorber & Straight, 1989, 1991, 1995; Straight, 1999, 
2000) have made the case for procurement organization evaluation via Performance 
Unit Costing (PUC). This method considers the cost of operations relative to 
performance units. Performance units are completed actions adjusted for the level of 
the quality of the output. Examples of quality factors include timely award, timely 




PUC is calculated by multiplying the number of output units (e.g., contract 
actions) by an achieved quality index (from .00 to 1) composed of some of the 
factors above. The result is the quantity of performance units. The number of 
performance units is then divided into the operating cost of the procurement 
organization to determine the cost per performance unit (Sorber & Straight, 1993). 
For example, 900 units of output at an achieved quality index of 0.65 yields 585 
performance units. If the procurement organization costs incurred were 10,000, then 
the cost per performance unit would be $17.09. Obtaining higher output levels while 
maintaining quality and cost would decrease the performance unit cost. Higher 
quality achieved at the same cost and output would also decrease PUC. Managers 
are provided with the insight that increasing quality factors may increase cost, but 
they may also identify some components of the quality index that can be affected 
without increasing cost, and other quality factors that can be improved to reduce the 
cost per performance unit 
The PUC methodology allows managers to move away from single factor 
workload indicators such as procurement lead time, action quantity, or dollars 
obligated. It combines the resource perspective of the cost to run the organization 
with the quantity and quality of the work performed. The model also has the flexibility 
to involve customers in determining quality measures and their relative weights or 
importance (Sorber & Straight, 1993).  
The PUC model seems to improve upon the Workload Index model discussed 
above by considering the total cost of the operation as the basis for analysis rather 
than the GS levels of the workforce, which are subject to step level gradation 
variability (all GS-14s are not the same, nor are they compensated the same). In 
addition, it allows for weighted workload credit depending on variable types of work 
output, and most important, it recognizes that all output is not the same (some work 
is of better quality than other work) (Sorber & Straight, 1993).  
In 2007, IBM published a useful guide entitled Seven Steps of Effective 
Workforce Planning (Cotton, 2007). The guide highlights the importance of creating 
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a forecast by (1) estimating workload and staffing requirements and (2) identifying 
the likely competencies and skill sets required. This approach stresses the 
importance of understanding the work prior to estimating the resources necessary to 
accomplish the work.  
Estimating workload is the heart of demand forecasts. Like the workforce 
supply projections, workload projections can be based on qualitative models, 
quantitative models, or a mix of the two. The key outputs of workload 
projection are the estimate of the type and volume of tasks to be performed 
and how many people will be needed to perform the tasks. (Cotton, 2007, p. 
16) 
Cotton (2007) also provides guidance on using quantitative and qualitative 
techniques to estimate staffing requirements. ―High-volume tasks that are mostly 
standardized are well suited to more quantitative analysis. Specialized, unique, or 
low-frequency tasks are more suited to qualitative techniques such as expert panel 
reviews or Delphi analyses‖ (Cotton, 2007, p. 17). 
The concept of involving stakeholders and other experts in a facilitated 
discussion or Delphi analysis to determine workload factors and weights is seen to 
be important to the successful implementation and acceptance of a workload model. 
Including stakeholders in the discussions to determine process times is identified as 
a key tactic in some of the models that are discussed in the Discussion Items of my 
report.  
Summary 
This review of the literature indicates that procurement workforce 
performance measurement and workload assessment have been areas of study for 
at least 70 years. There is a wide variety of benchmarks and models available to 
serve as the basis for government models. However, the review of the government 
organization literature indicates that the question of workload assessment has been 
given significantly less attention than output measurement, and that output 
measurement has been conducted primarily with overly broad measures such as 
dollars obligated and actions completed.  
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Further, the preponderance of the workforce modeling activity is now focusing 
on (1) measuring the size of the organization (impacts of retirement, accessions, 
etc.), (2) measuring the descriptive statistics or demographics of the workforce, and, 
to a lesser degree, (3) attempting to measure the capabilities of the organization vis-
à-vis competency assessments. While these assessments present leaders with 
important pieces of information, they are incapable of answering the critical question: 
How much work will we need to do? Understanding the competencies and 
capabilities of an organization assists managers in developing a ―mixed‖ human 
capital strategy; however, the literature indicates that leaders cannot determine the 
mix of capabilities required without determining the number of workers needed. The 
two variables affect each other with such great significance that to consider one in 
the absence of the other is an endeavor destined for failure.  
Given the significant number of new workers expected to be hired by DoD 
contracting organizations in the next several years, leaders are now presented with 
a tremendous opportunity to determine the optimum method of apportioning 
resources and measuring performance. A review of workload and performance 




III. Discussion Items 
Methodology 
The methodology used for this research relied first on an extensive literature 
review to determine the federal environment and the requirements driving acquisition 
workforce modeling, the progress made to date on strategic human capital 
initiatives, and the benchmarks and models developed by scholars and used by 
government and/or industry. The second major portion of the methodology was a 
series of over 60 interviews with subject matter experts from government 
procurement agencies. These interviews were used to obtain insight into the 
agencies’ processes or methods to determine the contracting office workload. When 
possible, samples of models or processes used by the organization were 
demonstrated. In this section of the report, the information obtained is presented for 
each agency in the following manner: (1) background information on the model or 
process used in the organization, and (2) strengths and weaknesses of the model 
based on the findings of the literature review. 
An attempt was made to identify and gather information about the models 
used in each DoD major component and in multiple civilian agencies. A limitation of 
this study is that no central repository of this information was identified in the DoD, 
and while the Federal Acquisition Institute has established a community of practice 
with sample models from various agencies, there is no way to confirm that all 
models in use by federal contracting offices have been identified or discussed in this 
report. Models deployed by for-profit firms in the private sector were not 
investigated. 
Army 
As the sponsor of this research report, the Army Contracting Command 
(ACC) has a great deal at stake with regard to identifying a workload staffing model. 
The reality is that the ACC operates in a Tables of Organization and Equipment 
(TOE) and Tables of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) environment. That is to say, 
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that the requirements process is mission driven at a macro level and not necessarily 
workload driven at an organizational level. Once the TOE and TDA are put in place 
and staff billets are determined, organizations often find themselves staffing to the 
organization chart and approved positions rather than conducting manpower 
assessments driven by a workload analysis. 
As a relatively new organization, the ACC has the unique opportunity to 
establish a standard workforce model for the recently amalgamated procurement 
offices now in the ACC. In order to pursue this objective, it is useful to discuss some 
of the models used by the organizations that were brought into the ACC organization 
when it was created.  
The first model considered is known as the Forces Command/Training and 
Doctrine Command (FORSCOM/TRADOC) model. This model is based on dollars 
obligated. Some of the drawbacks of using this measure as a stand-alone variable 
were discussed in the literature review. Furthermore, the FORSCOM/TRADOC 
model excluded many locations and used data that was eight years old, and that had 
no adjustment for the complexity of work. 
The next model considered is the Army Contracting Agency Southern Region 
Model. This model was more robust, using six variables to account for complexity 
including (1) action type, (2) the solicitation procedure used, (3) whether the action 
had specified delivery (versus indefinite delivery and quantity), (4) contract type, (5) 
the extent of competition on action, and (6) dollars obligated. While this model was 
only run for a limited population of locations, the use of multiple measures of 
complexity and the ability to weight these measures may prove to be useful. 
The Army has utilized the Air Force Manpower Standard for Operational 
Contracting (AFMIA, 2001) to conduct some baseline comparisons and to transfer 
work calculations in the joint environment. This model will be fully discussed in the 
Air Force section of this chapter. 
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As the ACC began its existence, several concept plans were required to 
create the organization. The first was developed to establish the ACC, but it was 
conducted without rigorous validation or workload analysis. The intent of this 
concept plan was simply to bring the organizations already in existence together 
under one umbrella.  
The second concept plan released in September of 2009, did use workforce 
planning data from the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to determine 
the activity time required for the Mission and Installation Contracting Command 
(MICC) and the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) components of the 
ACC. The DCMA model, Performance Labor Accounting System (PLAS) will be 
discussed in the DCMA section of this chapter. The 2009 Concept Plan workload 
analysis substantiated 282 additional Full Time Equivalent positions (FTEs) for the 
ECC (in non-continental U.S. and expeditionary billets) and 187 additional FTEs for 
the MICC (in continental U.S. billets). 
While the MICC does not have an organic manpower tool, they have run their 
work production numbers through the Air Force Manpower Standard and found that 
it resulted in a 1,357-person increase in their current manpower (from 1,157 on TDA 
to 2,514 per the Air Force model) (H. Wong, personal communication, April 14, 
2010). 
A third concept plan was scheduled for completion in 2010 to determine the 
appropriate staff size for the ACC’s Life Cycle Management Centers (LCMCs), a 
second evaluation of the MICC and ECC positions at the installation level, and an 
evaluation of the ACC headquarters staff requirements. For some of its 
computations, the third concept plan will utilize a model developed by the U.S. Army 
Material Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA). 
The AMSAA has been tasked with preparing manpower models for Army 
acquisition organizations since 1987. In 1999, the Army Material Command directed 
the AMSAA to baseline all functional areas in the acquisition process, including 
program management, staff/policy support, and contract administration. The model 
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developed as a result of this baseline was finalized in 2002. Two clusters developed 
based on the types of work accomplished, weapon system acquisition, and 
installation/camp support. Different process action times (PATs) or task completion 
times were used in each of the two sectors (J. Henderson, personal communication, 
May 4, 2010). 
The primary workload factors used in the AMSAA model are (1) contract 
actions, (2) solicitations, (3) the ratio of competitive to non-competitive actions, and 
(4) the number of acquisition systems managed. An interesting aspect of this model 
is the weighting applied to completive actions. Based on a regression analysis of 
actions processed, the AMSAA has assigned a 4.5 multiplier to non-competitive 
(e.g., sole source) contract actions. In other words, a non-competitive action is 
credited for 4.5 times the process action time allowed for completion when 
compared with a competitive action (J. Henderson, personal communication, May 4, 
2010). The last complete model run was in 2006; however, high-level assessments 
for the ACC as a whole have been accomplished since then. 
In 2007, the USAMA conducted site visits to create a new manning model, 
which was completed and briefed to the director at Army Contracting. However, the 
model results indicated that contracting was overmanned by approximately 100 
people.As such, the model did not pass the common sense test given the plethora of 
audits and investigations such as those presented in the previous chapter of this 
report indicating significant understaffing (D. Alexander, personal communication, 
April 22, 2010). 
Air Force 
In 2001, the Air Force published a manpower standard for operational 
contracting (AFMIA, 2001). The AFMS recognizes key workload indicators such as 
dollars obligated and total actions completed. It also recognizes that large dollar 
actions are more complex than small dollar actions, and as such, rewards more 
process time credit for actions above $100,000 than for those below $100,000.  
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The model recognizes the impact of expeditionary deployments on an 
organization, and has a mechanism for awarding manpower for such activity. It also 
recognizes the importance of the support roles of the contracting organization, and it 
awards manpower for Government Purchase Card (GPC) oversight, small business 
program administration, commander’s support staff, and IT support. The process 
time standards were developed by recognizing over 150 individual types of activity in 
the procurement process and at least 50 types of activity in the contingency 
contracting environment (AFMIA, 2001). As such, it is one of the most thorough 
manpower standards produced.  
The manpower standard workload formulas can be inserted into standard 
spreadsheet software applications for ease of computation. However, the parsing of 
data required to translate existing data into a useable format (e.g., the elimination of 
non-qualifying contract activity) can be burdensome. Because the Air Force model is 
more robust in many ways when compared to other agency models, it has been 
favored as the model of choice by many in non-Air Force DoD agencies, and has 
become the default model used in joint basing workload transfer negotiations. 
Despite the praise this model has received from many users, criticism for the 
standard has grown in recent years. Of particular note is that the manpower formula 
is outdated because it is based on the mean (or average) time for executing 
activities in 1998. As identified in the literature review, actions have become more 
complex and time consuming to execute in the past 12 years, and the number of 
complex contract actions has increased while less complex actions have decreased, 
and have often shifted to GPCs. 
Furthermore, critics assert that the manpower formula does not reflect the 
complexities of today’s business processes such as the Management and Oversight 
of Acquisition of Services Process (MOASP), the Performance-based Service 
Contracts, the Standard Procurement System, the competitive sourcing for multiple 
installation support, the increased post-award contract administration burden of 
service contracts on installation contracting offices, the strategic sourcing efforts 
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which require much more pre-award activity in order to develop commodity 
strategies, and the increased contingency deployments.  
In addition, the types of work that receive no credit in the Air Force model are 
a concern for many. For example, there is no credit given for dollars obligated or 
actions processed that are modifications to contracts, nor for processing orders off of 
centralized contracts, nor for awarding or processing utility contracts. The work 
associated with these efforts can be substantial, yet it is not credited in the Air Force 
model. The rationale for withholding credit is that post-award and order processing 
was ―built in‖ to the original time standards. In other words, in the manpower 
standard, when you are given credit for awarding a contract, you also earn all the 
necessary manpower to administer the contract. Given the changes in complexity 
and number of these types of actions since 1998, and the tremendous growth in 
multi-year contracts (which were much more rare in 1998), it calls in to question 
whether the original built-in process times are still an accurate reflection of the actual 
time required to complete the activities today.  A final critique of the Air Force model 
is that it is perceived to be similar to the time and motion studies conducted in the 
mid-twentieth century. Time and motion studies focus on increasing the efficiency in 
a process and measuring the time required to complete tasks. Although the models 
measure the time required to accomplish process tasks, they do not take into 
account the quality of the outputs that result from the process.   
In an attempt to address some of these criticisms and update the model, the 
Air Force undertook a Capability-based Manpower Standard (CMS) study in 2006. 
Significant issues were encountered during the 2006 study. Among them, modelers 
had a difficult time retrieving data from the new SPS system because the existing 
workload factors had been designed for the previous archival system, the Base 
Contracting Automated System (BCAS), and they were not compatible with the SPS. 
The nature of the study (Tier 1, as opposed to a more in-depth time and motion 
analysis) did not allow the modelers to fully address many concerns. Furthermore, 
specialized contracting actions (generally in support of tenant or non-local units) and 
the tasks of program management flight (primarily post-award focused) were 
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removed from the calculations and were not considered in the analysis. Having the 
model not recognize this workload, is a concern for those organizations that have 
the responsibility to complete it. In addition, the commander support staff, enlisted 
superintendant, and first sergeant credits were also removed and no credit was 
given for the work performed by those individuals. Some progress was made in 
areas such as an updated contingency deployment measurement process.  
The revised model proposed the calculation of workload based on two 
primary workload factors: authorized base population and centralized contracting 
dollars. While the new model did identify justification for an additional 145 positions, 
concerns were expressed by multiple stakeholders. These concerns focused on the 
methodology selected to count base population, with particular concern about 
counting students assigned to the installation. In addition, concerns regarding the 
failure to account for the necessary work of unit leadership persuaded the Air Force 
contracting community to decide not to implement the revised standard and to 
request further study and a follow-on CMS at a later date. 
Separate and distinct from the Air Force operational manpower standard, is 
the Air Force Workload Assessment Model (WAM) for weapon systems contracting 
developed by the Aeronautical System Center (ASC) at Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. 
This model relies on stakeholder assessments of the number of hours required for 
tasks at differing dollar thresholds. For example, an organization may earn 245 
hours to complete a sole source contract from $1million to $5 million, but earn 575 
hours to complete a contract from $25 million to $50 million. Similar threshold-based 
earned hours are awarded in service contract, competitive contract, and delivery 
order categories as well. In all, there are 49 differing actions that organizations can 
earn credit for. There are 16 modification types (supplemental agreements, funding 
actions, etc.), 10 undefinitized contract types (letter contracts, terminations, option 
exercises, etc.), 15 definitization actions (task order, delivery order, undefinitized 
contract action [UCA] definititization, etc.), and 8 miscellaneous actions (Freedom of 
Information Act [FOIA] requests, congressional inquiries, etc.). Stakeholder groups 
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meet to assign process times for each of these types of work (D. Baker, personal 
communication, March 22, 2010). 
Workload is determine through an annual data call exercise in which each 
buyer (with workload) on the installation (approximately 700) completes a 
spreadsheet by simply identifying the contract or program they are working on, and 
then identifying, via dropdown boxes, each of the actions they (1) accomplished in 
the past three months, and (2) are scheduled to complete in the coming three 
months. The assigned hours are not displayed to the buyers, and all workload 
assessment computations are calculated after submission. The data are aggregated 
through contracting offices and reviewed by contracting leaders so that they can 
concur with the input (D. Baker, personal communication, March 22, 2010). 
The data are further refined by assigning earned credit based on where the 
action is within the acquisition cycle. In other words, buyers earn partial credit for 
completing any of the 12 different portions of larger tasks of work in progress (e.g., 
25% of related task hours for reaching RFP issued; or 70% for negotiations 
complete). Further refinements occur based on the complexity factor assigned to the 
program office. Through stakeholder discussions, factors such as congressional 
visibility, program maturity, higher headquarters or PEO review thresholds, technical 
complexity, personnel mix and history, etc., are considered, and an indirect multiplier 
factor from 0.1 to 0.4 can be added to the workload input to compensate for 
additional workload due to program complexity (D. Baker, personal communication, 
March 22, 2010). 
Once the indirect complexity hours are added to the total hours earned for the 
six-month period, the result is divided by 880 (half of the 1,760 annual AF work hour 
standard) and the result is the number of positions earned for that contracting office. 
WAM calculates hours earned for actual buyers with workload. It does not calculate 
supervisors, procurement technicians, senior-level functional advisors, or contracting 
officers without workload. In order to recognize that trainees and interns often 
require more resources than the value they generate, these personnel do not have 
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any workload that they process assessed in WAM, neither do their available work 
hours count against available WAM earned hours for the organization (D. Baker, 
personal communication, March 22, 2010). 
A weakness of WAM is that it requires a manual data call once a year and a 
periodic validation by stakeholders of the earned hours attributed to workload types. 
It also relies on individual procurement specialists to accurately input their workload, 
determine the appropriate complexity level for the work, and determine the degree of 
completion of the total effort. In addition, it does not account for types or grades of 
workforce personnel. Forty hours earned through an action covers one FTE for a 
week, whether it is a GS-9 with two years of experience, or a GS-13 with twenty 
years of experience. To account for this, if a contracting office has a significant 
departure from the normal distribution of grade levels, the indirect complexity factor 
is designed to compensate for that shortfall. 
The WAM model has received positive reviews from many. In 2010, the 
director of the Air Force Material Command (AFMC) (of which ASC is a subordinate 
organization) directed that all contracting centers in the AFMC select an organization 
with which to beta test the WAM model. The beta test was intended to be the first 
step in implementing the WAM model throughout the AFMC. Some resistance to 
change has been identified with this project. Organizations have requested that they 
be allowed to modify the standards associated with the model action types to better 
reflect the time associated with their environment. So far, five additional model 
variations have been proposed; one each for the Air Logistics Centers or depots, the 
AF Nuclear center, the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Electronic Systems 
Center, and one for the remaining product centers (J. Fruhwith, personal 
communication, September 15, 2010). The AFMC contracting leaders’ immediate 
goal is to get an initial workload model in place for each of its contracting 
organizations.  As such it appears prudent to utilize the flexibility of the WAM model 
and tailor the task process times to reflect the local mission environment. Such a 
customized approach should help to facilitate initial deployment of the model 




The entire Air Force contracting community has an operational contracting 
workload standard. The Army would like to work toward having a workload standard.  
However, the Navy is not pursuing a Service-wide standard, but rather is allowing 
System Commands (SYSCOMs) to develop a standard if they find it to be of use. 
For example, at Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) there is no 
model because workload is seen as an art form not suited to mathematical 
modeling. Projected workload assessment is based on the work in place and on 
historical information. NAVFAC utilizes a Position Management Board to review 
requirements and ensure that they track with projected workload volume.  
Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) is an example of a SYSCOM 
that does have a model in use to measure work. The Time to Produce (TTP) model 
was originally developed by the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Norfolk at their 
Philadelphia location. The model uses PATs developed by two subject matter expert 
groups (representing simplified acquisitions and large acquisitions). The TTP model 
relies on data collected each month on completed actions. The data set includes 
product and service definitions of the action. The data are placed into simplified or 
large acquisition buckets. The headcount for the actions is tracked at the FISC level.  
A separate productivity model measures the actual productivity of the 
contracting specialists via a tally of simplified and large contract actions completed. 
Complexity is accounted for in this model by placing more complex actions in the 
―large acquisition‖ bucket, irrespective of the dollar level (S. Pierce, personal 
communication, May 7, 2010). Both the TTP model and the productivity model can 
be used to assess activity at the FISC-wide level, at the aggregate FISC level, or at 
the individual operating location. Due to the wide variability in average productivity 
per year and the wide variability in the nature of work performed, the models are 
best used to compare year over year performance trends at individual locations 
rather than to assess each location’s capability relative to other locations (S. Pierce, 
personal communication, May 7, 2010) 
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Defense Contract Management Agency 
After the Air Force Manpower Standard for operational contracting was 
developed, most DoD agencies moved away from attempting to implement 
operations research-based manpower models. Instead, the environment of working- 
capital-fund models drove some agencies toward development of unit-cost models. 
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) developed a Resource 
Utilization Model called an RUC and used it to assess workload and balance the 
workforce. However, in the post–Cold War environment when agency billets were 
being cut, gaps between the earned manpower identified in the RUC and the actual 
manpower on hand at the organization had a negative impact on morale. The 
perception that the agency would not be manned to the level required by the 
workload was one of the reasons that the use of RUCs was discontinued (R. 
Sawlsville, personal communication, March 30, 2010,) 
Today the DCMA uses the Performance Labor Accounting System or PLAS 
to capture work performed. The PLAS requires DCMA personnel to track their hours 
on a daily basis and attribute them to a program or contract. Much like a timecard 
system, the PLAS allows the DCMA to track the hours and processes performed in 
support of specific contracts and aggregates information into multiple reports 
including types of contracts supported, agencies supported, processes performed 
etc.  
The PLAS can also be used to calculate relative efficiency level comparisons 
between operating locations. This data are used at the headquarters level to track 
progress toward 3% efficiency improvement goals agency wide (D. Peterson, 
personal communication, April 20, 2010). The PLAS also allows calculations for 
earned value management in different functional areas. This information can 
determine if the capacity is adequate in a functional area such as quality assurance 
or cost and price analysis. 
The PLAS feeds information into the DCMA’s Enterprise Planning system, 
which allows the agency to calculate the projected workload, as well as the type of 
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support environment (e.g., pre-contract activity, post-award activity, contingency 
activity, etc.) and as a result, the workforce required (R. Sawlsville, personal 
communication, March 30, 2010). The DCMA is developing new position 
management tools to better calculate DCMA requirements (K. Smith, personal 
communication, April 21, 2010). The DCMA continues to work toward identifying top-
level workload indicator variables so that they can better plan for future 
requirements. 
The PLAS is a rich source of information for DCMA leaders. Its ability to 
capture actual touch times required to administer contracts is useful. The DCMA has 
assisted other organizations in base lining their workload by providing PLAS data on 
process times. However, some say that navigating through its 100 process codes 
and hundreds of contract numbers is not particularly user friendly. The difficult 
interface is suspected of reducing the accuracy of information collected because the 
system relies on buyers to seek out contract types and process codes on a daily 
basis. If buyers perceive the interface to be too complicated, and utilize the system 
option to reproduce yesterday’s entry as today’s input, then this eventuality serves 
as a threat to data accuracy. 
Federal Acquisition Institute 
As discussed in the literature review, the Federal Acquisition Institute has 
been tasked with developing a community of practice and sharing workload models 
utilized by federal civilian agency contracting offices. The FAI has made seven 
different models available for agencies to use to develop workload assessments. 
The first model is the Project-based Combined Model developed by the 
Department of Energy. This model identifies staffing needs based on project-level 
characteristics. These characteristics include the annual value of project work to be 
executed, the type of project, the project complexity, the manner of execution, the 
project phase, the level of regulatory involvement, and the degree of external 




The second model is the Multidimensional Model being developed by the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The model focuses on tasks in acquisition planning; 
pre-award and post-award activities. 
The third model, the Program-based Model, is also under final development 
from the Department of Transportation–Federal Aviation Administration and will use 
historical program data to derive recommended staffing levels for major acquisition 
programs. 
The fourth model is a regression model that provides two options to the user. 
Option one is to baseline agency spend to FY 2000. The model indicates that one 
contract specialist is required for each $5 million in spend. In option two, the 
regression model indicates that for each 45 contracts awarded, one additional GS-
1102 FTE is required. This model is very limited in application, does not consider 
complexity factors, and may better serve as a notional comparison model than an 
actual workforce staffing model due to its lack of specificity. 
The fifth model is the Volume-based Surge Tool developed for use as a result 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The model allows the use of 
agency work volume growth from a baseline spend year and can be refined through 
human capital planning and analysis. 
The sixth model is the Transaction Model based on agency procurement 
spend and contract manager staff counts from 2000–2008. The model requires input 
of actual spend and workforce for each year. An average productivity per contract 
manager over the eight-year period is computed and divided into current FY 
projected spend. The result is the number of contract managers required for this FY. 
The model assumes that the number of contract specialists input into the model 
reflects contract specialists with a contract workload (as opposed to policy, 
oversight, small business, etc.). 
The final model is the Conceptual Combination Model developed by the FAI. 
This model appears to be the most thoroughly developed of the seven options. It is 
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agency specific and requires agencies to identify complexity, risk, workforce 
productivity, and other elements. Agencies can adjust weights ratios and factors to 
better represent the agency operating environment. The model uses a baseline 
workforce factor of $15.8 million for the average productivity of contract managers. 
Of note is that the model uses a factor calculated for the years 1993–1996 as a time 
period in which contracting offices were considered optimally staffed for contracting 
professionals. 
Complexity is captured through an assessment of the percentage of simplified 
contract actions, the percentage of firm fixed price contracts, the percentage of 
definitive contract actions, and the degree of competition in agency contracts. Risk is 
determined to be low, medium, or high based on the spread of actions across the 
fiscal year, the propensity of cost and schedule changes, the number of Inspector 
General (IG) and GAO issues, the progress on defining the acquisition workforce 
and turnover, and contract monitoring. The complexity model seems to capture 
many factors that are worth further examination as to their contribution to better 
defining workforce capabilities, especially with regard to mission risk. 
Department of Homeland Security 
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a high-level 
staffing analysis of procurement resources to facilitate the largest government 
reorganization in U.S. history. The analysis consisted of a cost-to-spend ratio 
analysis using FY 2002 total obligations and salary expense. The study also 
calculated spend-per-employee using total obligations and number of employees. It 
compared the findings to benchmarks published by the CAPS. Each of these 
measures is discussed in the literature review.  
The study found that the DHS buying offices’ cost-to-spend ratios ranged 
from 0.20% to 2.28% with a mean of 1.06%. The study used cost-to-spend ratios 
available from other federal buying offices for comparison. The comparison ratios 
ranged from 0.71% at NASA–Goddard and 0.86% at the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) to 2.31% at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
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The mean of comparison agency cost-to-spend was 1.35%. The CAPS benchmark 
for mean cost-to-spend in the aerospace industry is 2.21%. The DHS compared 
favorably in both range and mean relative to the benchmark and comparison agency 
cost-to-spend ratios (Sorber & Bodnar, 2004). 
When looking at spend-per-employee, DHS organizations ranged from $2.8 
million to $44 million with a $12.4 million mean. Comparison agencies ranged from 
$3 million to $8.9 million and had a mean spend-per-employee of $6 million. The 
DHS had a higher average and a much wider range of spend-per-employee than the 
comparison agencies. By comparison, the CAPS benchmark mean for aerospace 
industry procurement was $5.3 million. 
The researchers then considered the upcoming planned FY 2004 obligations 
to calculate FTEs required. By dividing the planned obligations by the $5.3 million 
and the $6 million agency and industry benchmarks, the researchers identified a 
range of imputed FTEs appropriate for meeting the projected contracting office 
workload.  
However, since the researchers calculated average spend-per-employee as 
$12.4 million, it seems that $12.4 million would have served as a reasonable 
estimate, rather than the $5.3–$6 million estimate that was used in the study. The 
larger number could have at least been used to illustrate an alternative position with 
a slightly higher risk associated with it should the DHS have wished to accept that 
risk. Given that the factor is double the benchmarks used, the argument for 
accepting some risk beyond $6 million spend-per-employee would be warranted. 
Using the lower risk benchmarks, the authors identified a requirement for 220 
FTEs. When factored with the average DHS procurement salary of $150,650 (the 
planning average salary provided by the DHS), the result was a FTE budget of $32.9 
million. Given that this is the lowest risk profile, $32.9 million should be considered 
the maximum possible FTE budget .   
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A final finding of the study was the identification of the fees charged by 
agencies (such as GWACs, GSA, GovWorks, etc.) for performing contracting work 
for the DHS. The fees ranged from 0.75% to 8%. The researchers calculated an 
average fee of 2.5% and used it to illustrate the cost that would be incurred if 
requirements were sent to outside agencies for obligation. The researchers found 
that applying a 2.5% average fee to the projected obligation total for FY 2004 would 
result in $43.5 million in fees. When compared to the worst case FTE budget of 
$32.9 million, it is clear that use of outside agencies should be minimized in this 
example. However, for organizations with cost-to-spend ratios above 2.5%, a 
compelling argument for seeking outside support could be made.  
While the DHS study provides a great deal of insight into procurement 
workforce evaluation, it should also provide motivation for procurement leaders to 
ask, ―What is my cost-to-spend ratio?‖, if for no other reason than to better 
understand the implications of using outside procurement organizations. 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Maintenance and Supply 
Agency (NAMSA) is the executive agent for procuring NATO expeditionary 
requirements. They have operated as a fee-for-service agency with a variable fee 
depending on the level of support provided to that particular customer.  
The NAMSA is included in this report to illustrate that the challenge of 
workload assessment and staffing is not unique to U.S. federal or Military 
procurement agencies. As a result of a dialogue with NAMSA procurement leaders, I 
have determined that they too are searching for an effective workload model.  
Furthermore, like many U.S. federal agencies, they are struggling  to determine 
whether to manage contracting workload by inputs (funding received) or outputs 
(actions completed). 
The current NAMSA process to determine workload is more complex and 
time consuming than the process used in the DoD. In brief, the process requires 
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approximately 18 months to complete. It begins with sending workload 
questionnaires to customer countries. Based on the responses to those surveys, a 
workload forecast and staffing proposals are prepared. The proposals are reviewed 
by NAMSA/Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and then 
coordinated with senior leaders. The business case that is presented must provide 
compelling evidence to support every workforce position requested, not just requests 
for additions to previous manpower. Finally, all computations and logic must be 
based on actual ratios (i.e., number of employees to workload), technical estimates 
of the work (i.e., processing or completion times) and trend data of workload 
indicators (i.e., using database figures where applicable). 
This complicated procedure is labor intensive, and in most cases dated by up 
to 18 months when implemented. Needless to say, our NATO partners at NAMSA 
are very interested in any progress that can be made on the workload assessment 
and staffing challenges that are ubiquitous throughout contracting organizations.  
Joint Basing and BRAC 
Here is a final observation regarding the emerging importance of workload 
modeling. The absence of a common model to assess contracting office workload is 
not only problematic because it hinders the allocation of resources to locations 
where they are most in need, but also because it is problematic when joint 
operations are pursued or are required to combine operations and transfer workload 
from the responsibility of one Service to another. The absence of a common model 
has been evident in the case of joint basing requirements. Under BRAC 
requirements, several contracting offices (for example Ft Dix and McGuire AFB, San 
Antonio Area, Joint Base Andrews, and others) have been required to merge 
operations.  
While the transfer of work is always an intricate process, it would be much 
more straightforward if there were a common DoD workload assessment model. By 
and large the contracting work that is done at the installation level is 95% similar 
irrespective of whether it is performed by the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force. 
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Because of on-going joint deployment operations, the argument could be made that 
the Services operational contracting processes are becoming more alike as time 
passes. 
Recent negotiations to determine the amount of manpower required to 
accompany transferred workload in joint basing operations are perplexing and 
frustrating. As it turns out, the Air Force model was almost universally utilized to 
assess workload. Not because it is without flaw, as we have seen, but because 
relative to the other options available, it is (1) validated (by Air Force Manpower 
Agency) and (2) an active model currently in use by a Service.  
There have been observations during joint basing negotiations that the Air 
Force Manpower Standard covers some tasks that other services may not consider 
to be the responsibility of their contracting personnel. A review of AFMS 12A0 
(AFMIA, 2001) indicates that there are few if any tasks that are Air Force specific. 
Rather they are tasks inherent in sound requirements definition, acquisition planning, 
business advising, customer service, contract negotiation, award, and 
administration. There have been instances during joint basing workload transfer 
negations when one Service has asked that manpower identified via the Air Force 
model calculation be reduced in recognition of tasks in the model that other Services 
do not perform.  
That there are tasks that are performed by one service and not another 
seems to be another compelling reason for not only a single DoD contracting 
manpower standard, but also a standard contracting process task list. As joint 
contracting operations continue to increase, there should not be any question about 
the expectations of contracting personnel, no matter what uniform they wear or 
Service they work for.  
Limitations 
An attempt was made to identify and gather information about the models 
used in each of the DoD’s major components and in multiple civilian agencies. A 
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limitation of this study is that no central repository of this information was identified in 
the DoD for workload modeling or staffing methodologies. The Federal Acquisition 
Institute has established a community of practice with sample models from various 
agencies; however, there is no way to confirm that all of the models in use by federal 
contracting offices have been identified or discussed in this report. Models deployed 
by for-profit firms in the private sector were not investigated. This research is further 
limited by the manner in which models were identified and background data 
collected. Because there is no community of practice in the DoD, and no registry of 
subject matter experts, there may be models in use or subject matter experts that 
were not identified or interviewed for this report. The establishment of a community 
of practice would create great value for those charged with workload assessment 
and manpower assessments in the acquisition workforce. The findings and 
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IV. Findings and Recommendations 
The primary goal of this research was to identify differing methods used to 
assess workload and staffing in Army contracting organizations as well as in the 
Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Civilian, and other commercial contracting 
organizations. This report has identified the key elements of various DoD Services’ 
contracting workforce staffing models. This research investigated each of the 
Services’ workload and resource assessment methodologies in the operational (and 
in some cases weapon system) contracting environments. In addition, industry 
practices in measuring workload and procurement organization production were 
reviewed. 
Secondary research goals included identifying potential opportunities 
whereby the existing methodologies could be used to more accurately capture the 
amount and nature of the work performed by contracting organizations, to ensure 
that the complexity of the work being performed at various stages within the contract 
process was reflected in the workload models, and to ensure that the level and 
quality of work was reflected in performance measurement models.  
The information in this section presents the major findings identified during 
the course of this research. For each finding, a recommendation is made as to 
whom the finding should be addressed. The findings and recommendations are 
presented in two tables. Table 1 identifies recommendations that fall within the 
purview of the ACC to address. Table 2 presents recommendations that require 
coordination and action at the level of the Department of Army, the DoD, or higher in 






Table 1. Findings and Recommendations for Action at the 
Army Contracting Command Level 
Findings Recommendations 
F1. When workload assessment is 
performed, it is most often conducted at 
the sub-agency level. This approach 
provides maximum flexibility for 
procurement organizations to develop 
their own priorities and factor weights 
reflecting the priorities of their mission. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of 
developing models at lower levels, the 
resulting inconsistency of findings and 
methodologies leads to confusion when 
attempting to develop and deploy human 
capital strategies at the agency level. 
R1. Strategic intent developed at the 
highest level possible and closely aligned 
workload assessment and staffing 
processes should be pursued, 
developed, and implemented. A 
workload model should be developed 
that captures strategic intent and 
ensures that standard methods are used 
throughout the agency, but that allows 
for some flexibility if necessary to adjust 
weights depending upon the local 
operating environment. 
F2. The current emphasis in workforce 
analysis is on competency assessment, 
and demographic trend analysis, while 
relatively little effort is being placed on 
workload assessment and appropriate 
workforce size. 
R2. A thorough assessment of the ideal 
levels of both workforce size and 
workforce competency is essential. 
Focusing on one and not the other is 
insufficient. An assessment of 
contracting workload must be 
accomplished in order to determine ideal 
size and competency mix. 
F3. The growing complexity of contracts, 
particularly service contracts, has 
rendered "total contract actions" a poor 
measure of workload. 
R3. Avoid the use of workload measures 
such as dollars obligated or actions 
completed in the absence of additional 
control ratios, standardized base 
computations, or measures for 
complexity and output quality. 
F4. The lack of available information 
relative to workforce requirements, size, 
quality, and mix makes it difficult to 
assess whether more workers, more 
highly skilled workers, or a different mix 
of workers would improve acquisition 
outcomes. 
R4. Develop and implement a strategy to 
obtain more detailed information on 
workload requirements, with emphasis 




F5. The CAPS provides 11 meaningful 
procurement organization benchmarks 
including the following:  
(1) the total dollars spent by a 
procurement organization as a percent of 
total firm budget (how much of an 
organization’s needs are acquired via 
contract and what is procurement’s 
relative impact/importance to the total 
organization);  
(2) supply management operating 
expense as a percent of total spend (how 
much does it cost to spend each dollar of 
supplies or services that the organization 
procures);  
(3) supply management operating 
expense per supply management 
employee (the total cost—pay, training, 
benefits, etc.—of the average member of 
the workforce);  
(4) total spend per supply management 
employee (contract dollars awarded by 
the average procurement specialist);  
(5) annual spend on professional training 
per supply management employee;  
(6) professional training hours completed 
per supply management employee;  
(7) supply management group retention 
rate;  
(8) cost reduction savings as a percent of 
total spend;  
(9) cost avoidance savings as a percent 
of total spend;  
(10) average order/action processing 
cost;  
(11) average cycle-time (in days) from 
R5. Procurement offices should identify 
the CAPS benchmark(s) that are closely 
aligned with their strategic objectives and 
conduct benchmark comparisons to 
identify opportunities to improve and 
identify the best targets on which to 
focus resources. 
As detailed in F6 and F7, Measures (1) 
total spend as a percentage of Service 
budget; (2) operating expense as a 
percentage of total spend; and (4) total 
spend per procurement specialist 
represent opportunities to gain useful 
information quickly at relatively low cost. 
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requirement approval to issuance of 
order/contract.  
F6. Procurement organization cost per 
dollar obligated emerges from the 
literature review as one of the most 
promising measures of performance 
(CPDO or cost-to-spend). The DHS 
workload assessment example presents 
straightforward staffing opportunities via 
cost-to-spend analysis. 
R6. The ACC should conduct a cost-per-
dollar-obligated or a cost-to-spend 
benchmark analysis of the organization 
to determine whether it would provide 
value through a regular measurement 
and trend analysis. 
F7. The spend-to-budget ratio, is ―a 
measure of the impact that procurement 
operations have on an agency’s mission, 
that is, the higher the percentage, the 
greater the impact.‖ (Nelson & Sorber, 
2006, p. 2) For example, when dividing 
the total dollars put on contract by Army 
contracting by the total Army budget 
(personnel, operations cost, etc. plus 
contracts), the result provides a sense of 
the impact that the procurement 
organization has on the overall agency. 
The more the organization buys (rather 
than makes or performs internally) the 
more important the procurement role to 
the overall agency. 
R7. Conduct a spend-to-budget analysis 
to determine (and demonstrate) the ACC 
impact on Army operations. Track this 
measure over time to determine trends. 
F8. The Performance Unit Costing 
methodology allows managers to move 
away from single factor workload 
indicators such as procurement lead 
time, action quantity, or dollars obligated. 
It combines the resource perspective of 
the cost to run the organization with the 
key output measures of the quantity and 
quality of the work performed. The model 
also has the flexibility to involve 
customers in determining quality 
measures and their relative weights or 
importance. 
R8. Determine the efficacy of the 
Performance Unit Cost model in ACC 
contracting. Identify which quality 
measures are appropriate and conduct a 
pilot test to determine whether the PUC 
model provides an opportunity to assess 




F9. The ACC is a relatively new 
organization.  As such there is a  unique 
opportunity to establish a standard 
workforce model for the recently 
amalgamated procurement offices now in 
the ACC. I 
R9. Establish an ACC operational 
workload model with stakeholder 
participation and implement its use as 
soon as possible. 
F10. The Air Force model is more robust 
in many ways when compared to other 
agency models. It has been favored as 
the model of choice by many in non-Air 
Force DoD agencies and it has become 
the default model used in joint basing 
workload transfer negotiations. However, 
critics observe that its mean time 
calculations are 12 years old and were 
calculated in an era of less complex 
contract activity and fewer service 
contracts. 
R10. The ACC should use caution when 
utilizing the Air Force Manpower 
Standard without considering additional 
complexity adjustments. 
F11. The Air Force WAM model is a 
promising model for measuring contract 
workload for organizations with access to 
subject matter experts to define process 
action times, and which are willing to 
commit the time required for buyers to 
complete annual workload self reports. 
R11. The ACC should conduct a pilot 
test of the AF Workload Assessment 
Model (WAM) as a possible model for 
use in LCMCs and other weapon system 
contracting offices. 
F12. The Navy Time to Produce and 
productivity models are useful models to 
allow local contracting activities to 
measure their trend performance against 
their previous performance. Given the 
variable complexity of work by location, 
use at a higher level may be limited. 
R12. The ACC should consider further 
analysis of the Navy Time to Produce 
and productivity models to determine 
applicability to contracting activities in the 
ACC. 
F13. The PLAS is a rich source of 
information for DCMA leaders. Its ability 
to capture the actual touch times 
required to administer contracts is useful. 
The DCMA has assisted other 
R13. When utilizing the DCMA PLAS 
information, consider the potential for 
skewed data and ensure the similarity 
and applicability of functions and work 
performed before relying on the PLAS 
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organizations in base lining their 
workload by providing PLAS data on 
process times. However, some say that 
navigating through its 100 process codes 
and hundreds of contract numbers is not 
particularly user friendly. The difficult 
interface is suspected of reducing the 
accuracy of information collected 
because the system relies on buyers to 
seek out contract types and process 
codes on a daily basis. 
system results. 
F14. The FAI has a variety of workload 
models, and two of them, the project-
based and the conceptual combination 
model, provide rigorous workload 
assessments beyond the level of some 
of the other models reviewed. 
R14. Assess the usefulness of the FAI’s 
Project-based and Conceptual 
Combination models. Identify 
opportunities to leverage these models in 
the development of an ACC model. 
 
Table 2. Findings and Recommendations Requiring Action or Cooperation 
at the Department of Army Level or Higher 
Findings Recommendations 
F15. The logic behind the announced 
additional 10,000 acquisition workforce 
hires and 10,000 converted acquisition 
workforce positions is not readily evident 
or available for public review. 
R15. In the interest of transparency, 
publish the logic and mathematical basis 
for the additional 20,000 acquisition 
workforce positions now in process. If 
this information is already available, 
make it easily accessible. 
F16. DoD guidance is consistently vague 
on workload and staffing size, and uses 
language such as "appropriately sized 
cadre" without providing tools or 
methodology to assess workload and 
staffing. 
R16. DoD should form a contracting 
workload and performance measurement 
working group to identify and share tools 
and methods (similar to the FAI 
community of practice and toolbox) 
within DoD procurement community. 
Congress has made significant funding 
available for improving acquisition 
workforce capabilities, and the DoD has 
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focused on training and competency 
assessment.  However, given the arrival 
of 20,000 new acquisition workforce 
personnel, identifying funding for robust 
workload and performance models is 
urgently required. 
F17. No systematic approach is currently 
used to determine contracting office 
workload. 
R17. The DoD should develop and 
publish strategic intent for contracting 
offices along with closely aligned 
processes to measure workload. If the 
DoD is not willing to pursue this 
opportunity, then the Army or the ACC 
should proceed at their levels. 
F18. While the FAI has been a leader in 
workforce competency assessment, self-
reported competency assessments are 
at risk of self-report bias and assessment 
inflation.  
 
R18. If the FAI and the DoD continue to 
focus on competency assessment, they 
should seek to control for self-report bias 
by conducting objective interviews or 
scenario-based competency 
assessments with a sample of the 
population. Subsequently, comparing 
them to self-assessment competency 
scores would provide useful validation 
baselines regarding the accuracy of the 
self-reported competency assessments. 
F19. The 2010 DOD Strategic Human 
Capital Plan Update—The Defense 
Acquisition Workforce discusses five 
tools to assess workforce demographics 
and trends, but no tool for the consistent 
assessment of workload. 
R19. The DoD should establish a 
community of practice similar to the FAI 
and make workload models available to 
all Services. Standardization of models 
and an integrated information technology 
system would also allow reduced data 
collection cost.  
F20. The recent experiences from joint 
basing workload transfer negotiations 
highlight the need for a DoD contracting 
workload assessment tool and a 
standard contracting process task list.  
As contracting operations become more 
joint, there should not be any question 
about the expectations of contracting 
R20. Establish a common set of contract 
tasks and customer expectations to 
facilitate contracting in the joint 
environment. Establish or leverage an 
existing joint working group to develop a 
workload model(s) for the DoD and share 
information.   
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personnel, no matter what uniform they 
wear or what Service they work for. 
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